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THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER AND ORGANIZED
CRIME
RUSSELL BAKERt
The problem of organized crime presents one of the greatest
threats to the stability of our manner of living and to our form
of government. In a dictatorship, organized crime, along with all
manner of wholesome individual and group activities, .is ruth-
lessly suppressed. Can a free society such as ours protect itself
from those of its members who consciously select crime as a busi-
ness and make a life outside the law and, at the same time, pre-
serve the consitutional guarantees which we value and cherish?
These are serious questions. The answers must be supplied very
largely by the Bar and the judiciary. This paper is by no means
a final attempt to answer them. The effort in producing it will be
justified if it serves to emphasize resources within the law and
the Constitution which could be useful in meeting the problem.
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Law enforcement in terms of meeting the challenge of organ-
ized crime is often over-simplified by the claim that it is a local
problem. This statement is by no means reliable as a general
proposition, even where related to individual crimes. It is fatally
erroneous in the face of organized crime, which is a very large
and powerful business having national distribution and whose
central motive is profit. The phenomenon of syndicate crime is a
threat to all government, and the resources of government at all
t Member, Chicago, Illinois, Bar.
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levels must be mobilized to meet it. Th present power and afflu-
ence of the organized criminal is an indication of the degree to
which the popular myth "law enforcement is a local problem" has
been accepted.'
Taking the constitution of the State of Illinois as more or less
typical of the other state constitutions, we find that the governor
is the chief law enforcement officer, "who shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed."' 2 Where, as often happens in Illinois,
local law enforcement is paralyzed by the strangling grip of the
syndicate applied to a whole community,3 the governor is called
upon by the constitution to act. He has the state police at his
command and, of course, the militia if required.
A very serious defect in our executive machinery in Illinois is
the fact that each one of the more than 100 state's attorneys op-
erate independently and without any supervisory or coordinating
authority over them. This haphazard result was not contem-
plated by your constitution. The attorney general has the same
authority as pertained to that office at common law, and conse-
quently he does have authority superior to the state's attorney
within each county and could, if he desired, effect the necessary
supervision and coordination. 4 This is particularly necessary in
the face of the complicated pattern of syndicate crime, which
operates not on a county but on a state-wide and national basis.
It is a fair conclusion to draw that the resources of the state
constitution have not been fully used and certainly not exhausted
in the mobilization of weapons with which to fight organized
crime.
1. See former Governor Adlai Stevenson's article entitled, Organized
Crime and Law Enforcement: A Problem for the People, 38 A.B.A.J. 26
(1952), in which Mr. Stevenson contends that law enforcement is a local
problem and should not be taken over or aided by the state or Federal
Government unless and until local authorities have proved useless or in-
effective.
2. ILL. CONST. Art. V, § 6.
3. Headlines from Chicago papers: "Saloon Vice Grips Cal City Again,"
Chicago Daily News, Jan. 26, 1953; "Four Shot in Cal City Bar," Chicago
Daily News, Nov. 22, 1952; "Cal City Defies Vice Cleanup," Chicago Herald
American, Sept. 8, 1952; "Boozy, Sordid Cal City Still Oasis of Sin,"
Chicago Daily News, Aug. 25, 1952.
4. See the following Illinois cases for authority that the attorney general
may, if he wishes, act against organized crime and supervise the state's
attorneys: People v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 321, 46 N.E.2d 951 (1943); Rowan
v. Shawneetown, 378 Ill. 289, 38 N.E.2d 2 (1941); Saxby v. Sonnemann,
318 Ill. 600, 145 N.E. 526 (1925) ; People v. Looney, 314 Ill. 150, 145 N.E.
365 (1924); Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
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The central government, by virtue of the Federal Constitution,
has assumed full control of whole areas of our collective activi-
ties, such as customs, coinage, interstate commerce, immigration
and naturalization, and income tax. These delegations of author-
ity certainly cairy with them the duty of exercising the power
granted for the well-being of all the people who live by the law.
Therefore, when the income tax law is so written and admin-
istered as to create a recurring crop of gangster millionaires,
just cause for complaint exists. Crime as a business is one of
the largest industries in this country today. Consequently, taxa-
tion of income produced by such business is a particularly sensi-
tive point in the whole machinery of control and suppression. It
is difficult to justify a scheme of income taxation which taxes
income from honest business at the same rate as gains taken in
an illegal enterprise. Still more difficult is it to justify a system
of income tax law which, in the treatment of deductions and
losses of an illegal business, grants preference to the latter over
legitimate business.
The ultimate objective of this paper is to demonstrate the legal
basis for taxing illegal gains at a rate much higher than that
applied to income from legal sources and to show as well that the
current practice of allowing a deduction of losses and "legiti-
mate" expenses of an illegal business is based on premises wholly
untenable.
THE REGULATORY ASPECT OF TAXATION
The claim is made that the income tax law should have as its
sole function the raising of revenue for the Federal Government,
and that the Federal Government does not possess authority, un-
der the Constitution, to regulate, control, or suppress rackets
and organized crime pursued as a business, through income taxa-
tion. These claims lack constitutional support and are not justi-
fied by the history of taxation in this country and elsewhere.
Taxes played a significant part in the founding of the Republic.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the central government had
no right to raise revenue by taxation. It was forced to depend
upon the several states for voluntary contributions, which were
slow in arriving and often were never made. This, of course, was
a very unworkable and unsatisfactory state of things, and no na-
tion could operate under any such regimen. Consequently, the
Washington University Open Scholarship
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necessity of having in the central government the right to levy
and collect taxes led directly to the *adoption of the present Fed-
eral Constitution and, therefore, to the permanent founding of
our nation.
Taxation has always been associated with the raising of reve-
nue by the state,'and no doubt the raising of revenue will always
remain its chief function. That fact, however, does not imply
that taxation does not have, or that it should not have, other
important functions to perform in the modern state.
No longer is it correct to think of taxation in terms of produc-
tion of revenue alone. We know that the whole theory and prac-
tice of taxation has undergone a radical change in this country,
and, indeed, throughout the whole world, in the past 150 years.
During that time this country passed through several distinct
phases of taxation:
1. From 1789 to the Civil War, customs receipts were the
principal source of revenue.5
2. During the Civil War, income and inheritance taxes made
their appearance.,
3. From 1868 until 1913, excise taxes on liquor and tobacco
accounted for ninety per cent of the revenue collected by our
government.7 During that same period, a second attempt at a
graduated income tax was made.8
4. Beginning in 1913, a new and, as it turns out, the present
era of federal taxation began. This new period is distinguished
by the graduated income tax.9
Not only have the forms of taxation changed from one period
to the next, but the theories which support those forms have
varied as well. Both the form and the theory change as the eco-
nomic and social bases of society change. Fiscal forms and pat-
terns are always the outcome of these basic underlying but
dynamic factors.
As pointed out, customs duties, also known as tariffs, were
once the principal source of revenue of our government. At the
same time, the tariff was, and perhaps still is, an instrument of
national political and economic policy. Certainly the tariff is an
5. SURREY AND WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 2 (Temp. ed. 1950).
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 4.
8. Id. at 5.
9. Id. at 10.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss2/1
THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER
example of a tax measure which has serious regulatory conse-
quences. Today its prime function is not the raising of revenue.
It is highly regulatory in effect. It has a serious influence in the
cold war in that it prevents countries of the free world from
selling in the United States market and may very well force them
to trade with Russia and the Iron Curtain countries. 10
To what extent may the federal taxing power be used in deal-
ing with the problem of organized, commercial, syndicated
crime? The question really is: how far may Congress go under
the Constitution in the use of taxation as an instrument of regu-
lation and suppression of activities and enterprises that are dan-
gerous and undesirable, judged by the ethical, moral, and legal
standards of the community?
All taxation has a regulatory effect, whether so intended or
not, a fact easily illustrated in the provisions of the federal tax
laws presently in force. As a consequence of tax laws presently
extant, the growth of some businesses is stifled. Out of tax mo-
tives, some enterprises are operated as sole proprietorships,
others as partnerships rather than corporations. A business is
organized and operated as a cooperative or as a trust rather than
as a corporation because of a tax advantage enjoyed by the par-
ticular form selected. Financial papers frequently carry adver-
tisements of the offer of sale of business with long loss records
and accumulated deficits. A market for such companies exists
solely because of the nature and effect of the tax law. Tax-free
state and municipal securities with a low interest yield are pur-
chased and held instead of stocks and bonds. The family partner-
ship presents the phenomenon of infants as partners in business
enterprises. These are but a few of the many examples of the ef-
fects of our tax laws and their regulatory effect on economic
activity.
The very first law which Congress passed was the Tariff Act
of 1789.11 Duties were imposed by that law for the raising of
revenue. It was frankly stated in that legislation that it had for
its purpose "the encouragement and protection of manufac-
tures."'
10. See the excellent article by Sumner Slichter, More Imports Needed,
191 ATL. MONTHLY 37 (Jan. 1953).
11. 1 STAT. 24 (1789).
12. Id. § 1.
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In 1866, an annual tax of ten per cent was imposed on state
bank notes.1 3 The purpose of this tax was not to raise revenue
but to give the notes of the newly established National Bank a
monopoly of bank note circulation in the nation. The law was up-
held by the Supreme Court in Veazie Bank v. Fenno'4 not only on
the ground that Congress had authority to provide currency for
the nation and, hence, could prohibit all circulation except its own
obligations but on the additional ground that it had the power to
tax the state bank notes as property. This law has never been re-
pealed. It has produced no revenue.
The dairy industry of this country was articulate, in the pres-
sure group sense, as early as 1886, and in that year induced Con-
gress to impose heavy license taxes on oleomargine manufactur-
ers and dealers. A special tax of fifteen cents a pound was im-
posed on imported oleomargarine. 5 In 1902, the general rate of
tax on oleomargarine was fixed at ten cents a pound, while oleo
free from artificial coloring was set at a quarter of a cent a
pound. In 1902 the Supreme Court upheld this law in McCray v.
United States.17 It was not until 1950 that this legislation was
repealed.,8
The manufacture of white phosphorus matches causes an occu-
pational disease in which the jaw of the victim is eaten away.
After an unsuccessful effort by American manufacturers them-
selves to eliminate the use of white phosphorus matches, Con-
gress imposed a tax of two cents per 100 matches.", The law
successfully eliminated white phosphorus matches, which was its
purpose. It produced no revenue.
In 1914 an internal revenue tax of $300 per pound was imposed
on the manufacturers of opium for smoking purposes. 20 It was
believed by the proponents of this law that the only way in which
Congress could constitutionally stop the manufacture of narcotic
drugs was by the imposition of a prohibitive tax. Later in that
same year, a statute was pa~sed which levied a stamp tax of one
cent an ounce on narcotic drugs. It also provided for an occupa-
13. 14 STAT. 146 (1866), 18 U.S.C. § 250 (1946).
14. 8 Wall. 533 (U.S. 1869).'
15. 24 STAT. 209, 211 (1886), 26 U.S.C. § 2308 (1946).
16. 32 STAT. 193, 194 (1902), 21 U.S.C. § 25 (1946).
17. 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
18. 64 STAT. 20 (1950).
19. 37 STAT. 81 (1912), 26 U.S.C. § 2651 (1946).
20. 38 STAT. 277 (1914).
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tional tax on dealers and a detailed set of regulations. 21 These
occupational taxes were intended to be the constitutional basis
for a regulatory system that might otherwise have been held un-
constitutional. The Supreme Court, by a five to four decision, up-
held the act as constitutional.2 2 The majority opinion stated:
"The act may not be declared unconstitutional because its effect
may be to accomplish another purpose as well as the raising of
revenue . ..."23 The dissenting opinion stated that the "statute
was a mere attempt by Congress to exert a power not delegated"
to it by the Constitution.24
The Cotton Futures Act of 1914 imposed a tax of two cents a
pound upon all sales of cotton futures.25 Spot sales are exempt
from the tax. This law has produced no revenue. It was, how-
ever, successful in forcing the use of the specified types of con-
tract. This statute was not challenged in the courts and is still
operative.
The National Firearms Act of June 6, 1934, imposed a $200
annual license tax on dealers in firearms.2 6 This law was upheld
in Sonzinsky v. United States.27 It produces very little revenue.
In 1937 Congress passed a law regulating the coal industry and
imposed an excise tax of nineteen and one-half per cent of the
sale price of coal at the mine, with the provision that this tax
should not apply to any producer who had membership in the
Bituminous Coal Code set up under the statute.28 The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of this act,29 despite its simi-
larity to the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, 30 which
was struck down.- This decision is no doubt the result of the
broadening of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the inter-
state commerce clause of the Constitution.
Under the Social Security Act of 1935 an excise tax at the rate
of three per cent of the wages paid has been imposed, since Janu-
21. 38 STAT. 785 (1914), 26 U.S.C. § 2550 (1946).
22. United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
23. Id. at 94.
24. Id. at 95.
25. 38 STAT. 693 (1914).
26. 48 STAT. 1236 (1934).
27. 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
28. 50 STAT. 75 (1937), 26 (U.S.C. § 3520 (1946).
29. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
30. 49 STAT. 991 (1935).
31. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1935).
Washington University Open Scholarship
128 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ary 1, 1938, on employers of eight or more employees. 32. A credit
is allowed against this tax for amounts paid by the taxpayer into
the unemployment funds set up under state law and approved by
the Social Security Board. The total credit may not exceed ninety
per cent of the federal tax. Thus ten per cent of the tax is im-
posed for revenue, while the remaining ninety per cent is in-
tended to encourage states to'adopt unemployment compensation
systems. The plan has been successful, and such systems have
been set up in every state.
We know, of course, that the wartime excise taxes contained
in the Revenue Act of 194133 were enacted to discourage the pur-
chase of taxed articles and thereby to encourage the manufac-
turer to shift resources to the production of articles required
for the defense program. The desirability of such excise taxes-
was pressed upon the Treasury Department by Mr. Leon Hende.'-
son, Administrator of the Office of Price Administration and
Civilian Supply.34
It should be noted that the various features of the federal in-
come tax embody obvious regulatory objectives. The granting of
exemption to certain businesses and non-profit organizations to
encourage their activities is one form.3 Special tax encourage-
ment is given to religious, charitable, and educational institu-
tions. 36 The income of such organizations are exempt. Contribu-
tions to them may be deducted from the giver's income up to a
maximum of twenty per cent of the grossY.3 In addition, tne al-
lowance of a percentage depletion in oil, gas, and certain mining
industries satisfies a regulatory objective.8 A purpose is dis-
closed to stimulate exploration and development in the natural
resources industries.
The excise taxes on alcoholic liquors and on persons manufac-
turing and distributing them have regulatory aspects. The rates
would not be as high as they are if discouraging consumption of
such beverages were not believed to be desirable. The taxation
of this activity permits the Federal Government to regulate the
32. 49 STAT. 620 (1935), 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1946).
33. 55 STAT. 687 (1941), 26 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1946).
34. BLOUGH, THE FEDERAL TAXING PowER 414 (1952).
35. INT. REV. CODE § 101.
36. Ibid.
37. 66 STAT. 443 (1952).
38. INT. REV. CODE §§ 23(m), 23 (n), 114(b).
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alcoholic beverage industry.". Chapter 27 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code not only imposes taxes but prescribes as well account-
ing methods to be followed, the types of physical construction of
distilleries, and an elaborate system of reporting sales of alco-
holic beverages and distilled spirits.
The foregoing is a rather extensive but by no means exhaustive
list of federal taxes every one of which has a very strong regula-
tory purpose and effect. We see that the very first act of Con-
gress after the adoption of the Constitution was the adoption of
the tariff law, the regulatory characteristics of which certainly
claim equal, if not greater, importance than its revenue raising
function. We see that, from 1789 down through the intervening
years, tax laws, the regulatory character of which cannot be de-
nied, have been enacted by Congress and sustained by the Su-
preme Court. Therefore, is there any profit, as a practical mat-
ter, in further contention that the taxing power of Congress does
not include at least the incidental right at the same time to regu-
late the activity taxed?
Regulation by taxation is, as of now, a permanent and fixed
feature of taxing practice and philosophy. We should accept that
fact and apply it to our purpose of taxing all of the profit out of
crime.
The legal question is really this: does Congress have power
under the Constitution to regulate an activity by taxation which
it does not have power to control or regulate under some specific
delegation of that instrument? The question is fully answered in
United States v. Sdnehez:40
In enacting the Marihuana Tax Act, the Congress had two
objectives: "First, the development of a plan of taxation
which will raise revenue and at the same time render ex-
tremely difficult the acquisition of marihuana by persons
who desire it for illicit uses and, second, the development of
an adequate means of publicizing dealings in marihuana in
order to tax and control the traffic effectively."[41]
First. It is beyond serious question that a tax does not
cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or
even definitely deters the activities taxed .... The principle
39. BLOuaH, op. cit. supra note 34, at 416.
40. 340 U.S. 42 (1950).
41. SEN. REP. No. 900, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937); H. R. REP. No.
792, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
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applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negli-
gible, ... or the revenue purpose of the tax may be secon-
dary, Hampton & Co. v. United States .... [42) Nor does a
tax statute necessarily fall because it touches on activities
which Congress might not otherwise regulate. As was
pointed out in Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, . . . :[43]
"From the beginning of our government, the courts have
sustained taxes although imposed with the collateral intent
of effecting ulterior ends which, considered apart, were be-
yond the constitutional power of the law makers to realize
by legislation directly addressed to their accomplish-ment." [44]
These principles are controlling here. The tax in question
is a legitimate exercise of the taxing power despite its col-
lateral regulatory purpose and effect. 45
We must conclude from the decisions that:
1. Congress may regulate through taxation, even though the
revenue produced is negligible and the activity taxed is hampered
or even destroyed.
2. Congress has power to do this even in those cases where it
lacks constitutional power to regulate directly.
3. The constitutional limits to which Congress may go in the
use of the income tax law as a means of taking the profit out of
organized crime have not been approached. Congress has a duty
to use its power in this behalf.
LIMITS ON THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE
THROUGH TAXATION
The case of McCray v. United States4" represents the high-
water mark of congressional power, sanctioned by the Supreme
Court, regulate through taxation. Congress had no power to
regulate or prohibit the manufacture of oleomargarine under
the commerce, or any other, clause of the Constitution. The tax
which Congress imposed was so heavy that it seriously limited
the business possibilities of the oleo manufacturers. This was
the frank design of the statute. The measure, consequently, pro-
duced only a very small amount of revenue. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court upheld the law in a decision which has never been
overruled.
42. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
43. 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
44. Id. at 47.
45. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 43, 44 (1950).
46. 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
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Congress has the power to classify taxpayers according to the
activities from which the income results. The McCray case is
such an example. It may also classify income as to origin or
geographical source. Sections 109 and 454 (f) 4 7 are clear exam-
ples of such classifications. Income of eleemosynary corporations
is treated differently from that of a business enterprise. This is
a classification based on the use to which the taxpayer puts the
income.
Consequently, no objection could be raised to a classification of
income on the basis of the legality or illegality of its source. No
valid reason exists for not taxing illegal gains at much higher
rates than honest income.
In Barclay & Co. v. Edwards,48 the Supreme Court held that
the "power of Congress in levying taxes is very wide, and where
a classification is made of taxpayers that is reasonable, and not
merely arbitrary and capricious, the Fifth Amendment cannot ap-
ply." In the earlier case of Evans v. Go-re,' 9 the Court had noted
that the taxing power of Congress could be applied "to every ob-
ject within its range 'in such measure as Congress may deter-
mine' "50 and "enables that body 'to select one calling and omit
another, to tax one class of property and to forbear to tax an-
other,' " and that the tax might be applied "in different ways
to different objects so long as there is 'geographical uniformity'
in the duties, imposts, and excises imposed. ' 52 There could, then,
hardly be room for complaint of arbitrary or capricious action if
Congress should decide to divide taxpayers into distinct cate-
gories on the basis of the legality or illegality of their activities
and to apply one rate to legitimate income and another and much
higher rate to illegal gains.
It costs the government much more in time and expense to
collect a tax on income produced by an illegal business than it
does to collect from honest enterprise. On that basis alone, a
large differential in rates is absolutely necessary to defray the
extra cost. The fact that the high rate of tax would put the or-
ganized criminal out of business is a matter of which no one,
47. INT. REv. CODE §§ 109, 454 (f).
48. 267 U.S. 442, 450 (1924).
49. 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
50. Id. at 256.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
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not even the criminal, can complain. He is simply seeing democ-
racy at work at the necessary task of preserving itself from those
who would destroy its basic foundations.
There is an obvious inconsistency in the tacit condonement
which the Federal Government extends to the criminal when it
taxes the income which he has taken from the community, often
by force, but always in defiance of its laws, at the same rate as
that which it applies to wholesome, honest income. The situation
is even more grotesque when it is realized that the racketeer re-
ceives preferential treatment under the current application and
enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code.
PRESENT METHODS OF TREATING THE EXPENSES
AND LOSSES OF ILLEGAL ENTERPRISES
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Tax Court
hold that "legitimate expenses" of an illegal business are de-
ductible.53 They hold that items like rent, light, salaries, gaso-
line, depreciation, and similar items can be deducted by an illegal
enterprise as "the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or in-
curred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business .... 54
This result is possible only on the basis of gross favoritism of
the racketeers. A vast loophole has been created in the adminis-
tration of the income tax law which could be closed immediately
if the desire to do so were present at the administrative level in
the enforcement machinery. The Commissioner and the Tax
Court are simply not following the law in the treatment that they
are affording expenses and losses of illegal enterprises.
The income tax law as originally enacted in 1913 made no
pretense of taxing illegal gains. It imposed a tax upon the gains
and profits from "any lawful business." 5
The Revenue Act of 1916 re-enacted section 166 of the previous
act, verbatim, except that the word "lawful" was omitted, so that
the tax was, by the 1916 Act, imposed on "interest, rents, divi-
dends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on.
53. Comeaux v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 201, 207 (1948), aff'd in Cohen
v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d (10th Cir. 1949).
54. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (a) (1) (A).
55. 38 STAT. 167 (1913).
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for gains or profits and income derived from any source whatso-
ever.,,56
The sections of the various revenue acts which deal with de-
ductions from gross income have varied very little through the
years, so that what is said about the current law57 applies with
equal force to the preceding years.
From 1913 to 1925, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue re-
fused to allow the expenses of an illegal business to be deducted
from gross income. He also refused to allow losses suffered in an
illegal business to be subtracted or deducted from gross income,
regardless of whether the gross income was from an illegal or a
legal activity. These opinions he clearly set forth in the bulletins
which he issued during that period.5
56. 39 STAT. 756 (1916).
57. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (a) (1) (A):
Sec. 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) Expenses.-(1) Trade or business expenses.-
(A) In general.-All the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered; traveling expenses (including the entire
amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from
home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and rentals or
other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or
business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken
or is not taking title or in which he has no equity....
Section 23 (e) relates to losses and provides as follows:
(e) -Losses by Individuals.-In the case of an individual, losses
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by in-
surance or otherwise-
(1) if incurred in trade or business; or
(2) if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit,
though not connected with the trade or business; ....
58. I.T. 1983, 111-17 CuM. BULL. 1514 (1924) stated that the expenses of
an illegal business were not deductible:
The taxpaper accepts bets outside of licensed race tracks and under
the statutes of the State of Kentucky his business is illegal.
Held, the taxpayer is not entitled to claim deductions on account of
expenses incurred in carrying on an illegal trade or business under
section 214 (a) 1 of the Acts and he should file returns of income for
all years even though in some of them his losses and expenses exceeded
his winnings.
The same opinion was expressed in I.T. 2127, IV-1 CuM. BULL. 138 (1925):
Inasmuch as the operation of baseball pools is illegal in the State
of Wisconsin, the amount paid out in prizes and the expenses of operat-
ing the pools are not allowable deductions as expenses incurred in
carrying on a trade or business as contemplated by section 214(a) 1
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In 1925 the Board of Tax Appeals was called upon to decide
in James P. McKennO5 9 whether a bookmaker in the State of
Kentucky, where his activities were illegal, should be allowed to
deduct from his gross receipts the amounts he paid out to win-
ners. The bookmaker operated on a modified parimutual system.
He treated his bookmaking en bloc and deducted from his year's
receipts the payments made to winning bettors, as well as
amounts returned to bettors in cases where bets were called off.
The Commissioner disallowed the deductions of the amounts
paid to winners or returned to bettors and restored them to in-
come. The Board stated the issue on the case to be "whether the
winnings realized from gaming operations are taxable as income
and if so, what portion of said winnings constitutes taxable
income." 60
The bookmaker contended that his winnings on handbook op-
erations should not be taxed at all because: (1) they did not con-
stitute income within the view of the Sixteenth Amendment to
the Constitution or within the Revenue Act of 1918; (2) under
the laws of the State of Kentucky, such winnings were gifts and
not income; and (3) even if construed to be income, they were
not such until after the statutory period of limitations had tolled
the loser's right to recover his losses.
The bookmaker contended that his winnings were gifts and
not income. The Board's opinion did not set out specifically what
the contentions of the Commissioner were. It must be assumed,
however, that his restoration to income of the amounts paid out
to winners corresponded to the requirements of his published
of the Revenue Act of 1921, and the taxpayer should file returns
reflecting as his net income from the operation of the baseball pool the
entire receipts therefrom, without credit for any deductions.
With regard to losses of an illegal business, I.T. 1854, 11-2 CuM. BuLL. 125(1923) was to the effect that "losses in an illegal transaction are not de-
ductible under the Revenue Act of 1921." SOLICITER'S M EMORANDUM 2680,
111-2 Cui. BULL. 110 (1924) was to the same effect:
Under Article 141 of Regulations 45, it is the rule of the Bureau
that losses sustained in illegal transactions were not deductible in the
determination of net income. This rule is also applied to the year 1917.
It is necessary, therefore . . . to determine the status of losses in-
curred in betting on horse races to determine the legality of such
transactions in the various States in which the taxpayer operated dur-
ing the period in question.
59. 1 B.T.A. 326 (1925).
60. Id. at 328.
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rulings to the effect that losses sustained in illegal transactions
could not be deducted in determining net income.61
The holding in this case was that the winnings of the book-
maker, less his losses, constituted taxable income. The basic
fallacy of this position is apparent. The Board completely ignored
the fact that the bookmaker was engaged in an illegal and un-
lawful enterprise. It treated him as though he were a legitimate
merchant selling goods or services in wholesome commerce and
allowed gross income to be determined by subtracting from gross
receipts the cost of goods or services sold. The inescapable fact
is that the bets paid did not represent expenses "incurred,"
since the winners had no legal right to enforce payment. This
is true whether the gambler operated one hour, one day, or one
year, and whether he made one bet or a thousand bets. These
basic elements were ignored by the Board.
The view was expressed by the Board that "[t]he income tax
law is strictly a revenue measure enacted for the purpose of
raising the necessary revenues for the Federal Government. ' '6 -2
That premise is unsound. It is based on a philosophy that cor-
responds to neither the facts nor the law. There are many pro-
visions of the Code whose purpose and effect go far beyond the
raising of revenue. The depletion allowance available to the oil
and other natural resources industries" can be added to the
examples already mentioned to show that the Board's basic con-
cept of the income tax law as expressed in this opinion is com-
pletely out of harmony with reality.
The Commissioner acquiesced in the McKenna case and im-
mediately revoked his prior rulings limiting deductibility of los-
ses in illegal operations.14 His haste in this respect contrasts
strangely with the persistence and tenacity with which he is
known to pursue revenue where legitimate business is the
quarry.65
61. See note 58 supra.
62. James P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A. 326, 330 (1925).
63. See note 38 supra.
64. I.T. 2175, IV-1 CUM. BULL. 141 (1925).
65. Commissioner v. East Coast Oil Co., 85 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 608 (1936), was decided in 1936, overruling G.C.M.
8594, IX-2 CuM. BuLL. 354 (1930). The Commissioner did not acquiesce
until 1947 in G.C.M. 25131, 1947-2 CuM. BuLL. 85. Dexter v. Commissioner,
37 B.T.A. 1331 (1938), aff'd, 99 F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1938), and Commissioner
v. Nell, P-H 1942 TC MEM. DEC. 42,586 (1942), petition to review denied,
139 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1944), were decided in 1938 and 1942, overruling
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Three days after the McKenna case was decided by the Board
of Tax Appeals, the opinion in Mitchell M. Frey",; was filed. The
decedent was a successful businessman. He indulged in betting
and gaming as an incident to his leisure hours, and these opera-
tions extended generally throughout the year. During 1919, he
won $900 and lost $26,105 in betting on races, poker, and rou-
lette. In 1920 he won $26,588 and lost $64,996. These amounts
were won or lost in illegal operations. The estate claimed that
the transactions were entered into for a profit. The amounts won
were included as income and the losses claimed as a deduction
from total income. The Commissioner argued that each venture
was a separate item, that those in which winnings were made
stood apart from those in which money was lost, and that total
winnings had to be returned and taxed, while totals of the losses
could not be deducted.
The opinion in this case recognized the voluntary nature of
the payment of gambling losses and concluded that such losses
were not "incurred" within the meaning of section 214 (a) of the
Revenue Act of 1918.67 The Board held also that the word
"transaction" as used in the statute meant a legal transaction.
On the basis of the decision in the McKenna case, however, the
Board held that the decedent's tax liability should be computed
on a yearly basis and if, as was the fact in this case, his losses
exceeded his gains, he would in reality have had no gain, hence no
income, from gaming.
This refusal by the Board to test each expenditure separately
as to its deductibility in arriving at net taxable income consti-
tuted a clear departure from the law as announced in the same
opinion. It represents as well gross favoritism of illegal business
over honest enterprise. If an expenditure is not deductible be-
cause it is not "incurred" in a "legal" transaction, there is no
reason to permit its deduction in an illegal activity. The fact
that the taxpayer won some money in an illegal transaction dur-
ing the year means simply that he had taxable income. Money
lost in illegal gambling is not made deductible as "incurred"
simply because more was lost than was won. The case was
rulings of the Commissioner. He is still trying to enforce his views with
regard to section 131 of the Internal Revenue Code. See Brace v. Com-
missioner, P-H 1952 TC MIm. DEC. 52,265 (1952).
66. 1 B.T.A. 338 (1925).
67. Ibid.
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wrongly decided. It should have been appealed. Instead it was
acquiesced in.
These two cases, McKenna and Frey, constitute the opening
wedge through the operation of which a glaring loophole has
been worked for the benefit of syndicate gamblers and racketeers.
Within a few days after the opinions in the McKenna and
Frey cases, the Commissioner issued a bulletin incorporating the
holdings in those cases. 8
THE LEGAL POSITION OF EXPENSES AND LOSSES OF AN
ILLEGAL BUSINESS UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
There are at least three good, sound, unassailable reasons why
expenses and losses of an illegal enterprise are not deductible:
(1) an expense or a loss is not "incurred" under section 23 of
the Code unless it represents a legally fixed and binding obliga-
tion; (2) the words "trade or business," as used in section 23 of
the Code, mean a legal trade or business; and (3) expenses and
losses of an illegal enterprise are not deductible where to allow
their deduction would frustrate sharply defined policy.
1. An expense or a loss is not "incurred" under section 23 of
the Code unless it represents a legally fixed and binding obliga-
tion.
Voluntary disbursements, such as gratuities, "debts of honor,"
"moral obligations" cannot be deducted as losses by a legitimate
68. I.T. 2175, IV-1 CuM. BULL. 141 (1925) provides as follows:
In the appeal of James P. McKenna (decision No. 127, docket No.
121, 1 B.T.A. 326), acquiesced in by the Commissioner, the Board of
Tax Appeals held that the net gains of the taxpayer arising out of his
illegal business of operating a handbook constituted taxable income
under the Revenue Act of 1918, but that the gross income of the tax-
payer derived from such bookmaking operations should be determined
by applying against the total receipts therefrom the sum of the
amounts paid to bettors on his handbook plus amounts returned to
bettors by reason of scratches, called-off bets, and lay-off bets.
In the appeal of Mitchell M. Frey, et al., executors William B.
Scaife Estate (decision No. 128, docket No. 391, 1 B.T.A. 338),
acquiesced in by the Commissioner, the Board of Tax Appeals held
that losses sustained in illegal gambling operations are not deductible
under Section 214 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1918. The Board held, how-
ever, that the taxpaper was entitled to offset his gains from illegal
transactions against his losses from such transactions and, therefore,
the amounts won by the taxpayer during the years in question, being
less than the losses sustained by him, did not constitute taxable income.
In view of these decisions, I.T. 1983 (C.B. I1-1, 124) and I.T. 2127
(see page 138) are modified to conform thereto.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
business. The word "incurred" means that a legal obligation had
become firmly fixed before the disbursement was made. Abun-
dant case law, including the cases of Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush
Co.,69 and Bauer Bros. v. Commissioner,'0 establishes this inter-
pretation of the word "incurred" as used in section 23 of the
Code. All of the cases, it is admitted, deal with legitimate busi-
ness. If a legitimate business, in order to deduct an expense or a
loss, is held to the rule that the sum sought to be deducted must
represent a legal obligation, does it not produce a grotesque re-
sult to say that if the enterprise is illegal, if it is a racket, then
disbursements which do not represent legal and binding obliga-
tions may be deducted as expenses and losses?
Applying the principle of lawof the Bauer and Lucas cases to
the subject matter before us, it seems very evident that where the
owner of real estate leases it to a gangster or to a vice, narcotics,
or gambling syndicate, and the property is used for illegal pur-
poses, the lease is not enforceable and the landlord cannot collect
the rent. The landlord is under a duty to see that his property is
not used for illegal purposes. He is presumed in law to know
what uses *are being made of his premises.71 The payment of the
rent by the operator of such an establishment is purely volun-
tary.72 The rent is not an enforceable obligation and should not,
therefore, be permitted as a deductible expense.
The salaries which a racketeer pays to his assistants arise
69. 281 U.S. 115 (1930).
70. 46 F.2d 874, 875 (6th Cir. 1931):
.s. Our first concern is with the sense in which the term "incurred"
is used in section 234. It seems not to be disputed here that expenses
are incurred only when there is an agreement or a legal obligation to
pay them.... Indeed, that seems to be the view taken of the very
language of this section by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Lucas, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ox Fibre Brush Co.,
281 U.S. 115....
" "it will therefore be observed that, whether the term "incurred" as
used in the Revenue Act of 1918 is used in a technical legal sense or in
an economic or bookkeeping sense, the expenses are not incurred unless
there has arisen a legal obligation to pay them, and they do not accrue
within a given taxable year unless all the events which fix the amount
and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay occur within that
year.
71. People v. Brickey, 332 Ill. App. 370, 75 N.E.2d 534 (1947) ; People v.
Viskniskki, 155 Ill. App. 292 (1910); People v. Leach, 143 Ill. App. 442(1908); People v. Brewer, 142 Ill. App. 610 (1908).
72. Harris v. McDonald, 194 Ill. 75, 62 N.E. 310 (1901); Heidenreich v.
Ragglo, 83 Ill. App. 521 (1899); McDonald v. Tree, 69 Ill. App: 134 (1897).
Also see ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 333 (1951).
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through a void employment contract. If such an employee sues
the gangster for his wages for helping him( the gangster) com-
mit a murder, an extortion, a rape, it is perfectly obvious that
nothing can be collected on such a contract. It is equally true
that the cashiers, the shills, the steerers, the chauffeurs, the wait-
resses, the bartenders, employed in the gambling joint cannot
enforce those wage contracts, and the payment of their salaries
for the purposes of section 23 is purely voluntary.7 3 The duties
thus performed represent integral parts of the illegul venture.
They are not "just a little bit illegal"; they are entirely illegal.
This view is well expressed in Silberman v. Commissioner74
where the Board said:
Petitioner's gambling operations were illegal and the
amounts he expended for fees and salaries were expendi-
tures made to obtain occupancy and services which were il-
legal. Petitioner contends that the gambling activities were
not "illegal" because they were not "criminally punishable,"
or that they were "illegal" only in the sense that they were
"ultra vires." The argument is without merit and is confused
in many respects. It is wholly immaterial here that the sta-
tutory offense involved is malum prohibitum rather than
malum in se. Petitioner's argument in essence is that his
gambling operations were only "a little bit" illegal because
the penalty of forfeiture of a bet received if a civil action
is brought to recover the bet is only a slight penalty. The
only merit of the argument is its humor. We must proceed
here with recognition that without any doubt betting, receiv-
ing, and recording bets, letting a booth be used for the same,
and assisting anyone in doing the same, all were illegal un-
der New York statutes.75
In the Silberman case the operating expenses were those of a
race track gambler. He rented booths at various tracks. He em-
ployed persons to register bets and to assist him. He paid salaries
for their services. These items aggregated $12,633 for the tax-
able year. Silberman claimed he was entitled to deduct the items
as ordinary and necessary business expenses or as losses under
section 23. Under state law it was illegal to rent a booth to be
used for receiving or recording bets, and it was also illegal to
73. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 325 (1951), makes it a crime to rent places
for gambling purposes. Also see ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, § 329 (1951), making
all contracts based on gambling void.
74. 44 B.T.A. 600 (1941).
75. Id. at 603.
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assist in receiving or recording bets. The lease was unenforce-
able, as were the employment contracts.
The considerations which require expenses of an illegal enter-
prise to be unavailable as a deduction would also make illegal
gambling unavailable as deductions, except for the distortion
created by the case of Humphrey v. Commissioner, 7 to be noted
hereafter.
The foregoing view is supported by the holding in Wagner v.
Commissioner.7 Taxpayer in that case invested $15,000 in a
small loan business in violation of the laws of Michigan. The
district attorney raided his office, tore the place apart, and con-
fiscated the records. The total investment was lost. In denying
a deduction as either a loss or an expense, the Board took the
view that the enterprise was illegal and that neither a loss de-
duction nor an expense deduction can be had if they are incurred
or sustained in the commission of acts forbidden by statute or in
the omission of acts made mandatory by statute, subjecting those
guilty to either a fine or imprisonment or both. The reasoning
which leads to such a result as to an expense applies with equal
force to a loss.78
2. The words "trade or business," as used in section 23 of the
Code, mean a legal trade or business.
The case of Humphreys v. Commissioner 7 (not to be confused
76. 162 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1947).
77. 30 B.T.A. 1099 (1934).
78. In the Wagner case, supra note 78, the court said:
The petitioner engaged in a business prohibited by the "Small Loans
Act" of Michigan. He made loans under contracts which he knew or
should have known were void and unenforceable under such act. In our
opinion the instant proceeding is governed by the principle enunciated
in the above cited cases and is a loss arising from the operation of a
business prohibited by state statutes, subjecting those violating them,
upon conviction, to fine or imprisonment, or both, and is not deductible
under section 214 (a) (4) and (5) of the Revenue Act of 1926.
Id. at 1106, 1107.
79. 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942):
The further controlling facts adduced at the hearing before the
Board showed that during the tax years in question the petitioner was
not engaged in any legitimate business. He was regarded as a gangster
and racketeer....
Id. at 341.
The final point raised concerns the disallowance of $2,526 as a busi-
ness expense, made up as follows: $500 for gasoline and oil; $451 for
garage and service; and $1,575 on account of depreciation on an auto-
mobile. Expenses of this nature are deductible only if they are in-
curred "in carrying on any trade or business" § 23(a).... The
Board sustained the action of the respondent in disallowing these de-
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with Humphrey v. Commissioner) illustrates this principle of
statutory construction. The court stated that Humphreys' pro-
fession was regarded as that of a gangster and a racketeer. He
claimed as deductible expense the cost of the gasoline for the
automobile used in transportation about the city of Chicago to
and from his illegal business. Another item was for garage
storage, service, and depreciation. The case reached the Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit. The Board of Tax Ap-
peals, -'"' as well as the Circuit Court, found that Humphreys was
not engaged in any "business" within the meaning of the statute,
because his activities were illegal. He was not engaged in any
legal business. On a parity of reasoning, it follows that a gam-
bling, narcotics, or vice joint is not a "business," with the con-
sequent result that operating expenses are not deductible.
Humphreys' activities which produced his income were illegal
and illegitimate. So are the activities of the proprietor of a house
of prostitution. So are the activities of the proprietor of a
gambling house or a horse parlor, or those of the owner or
operator of slot machines, in all except one or two of our states.
It is a crime in Illinois, and in most other states, to employ a
man to work in a gaming house.' It is a crime to lease property
for that purpose.-, In the face of the Humphreys decision, how
can it be claimed that the expenses and losses of such businesses
are deductible under section 23? The expenses for light, heat,
and salaries are items which are integral parts of the legal enter-
prise. There are no such things in law as "legitimate expenses
of an illegitimate business."
The words "trade or business" in section 23 can only mean
legal trade or business. A strong authority for this proposition
and the principle involved is Walsch v. Call,83 which had to do
with the interpretation of an exemption statute which exempted
from execution the goods of a person used in his trade or busi-
ness. The plaintiff was operating a saloon and selling liquor
ductions on the ground that the petitioner was not engaged in any busi-
ness within the meaning of the statute. We agree and in view of what
we have already said in this opinion relative to petitioner's activities, it
will not be necessary to discuss the matter further.
Id. at 343.
80. Humphreys v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 857 (1940).
81. ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, § 325 (1951).
82. Ibid.
83. 32 Wis. 159 (1873).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
illegally. An execution was levied on the liquor, and the owner
caimed the benefit of the statute. The court stated:
... [W]e are of the opinion, and so hold, that the term
"trade or business," as tised in the statute . . . must be con-
strued to mean some lawful trade or business, and that no
person who is engaged in any business which is prohibited
by law, is entitled to any exemption of his tools, implements
or stock in trade used and kept for the purpose of carrying
on the same, unless such property be exempted by some pro-
vision of law other than the statute under consideration.84
The widening breach of the loophole is observed in the opinion
of the Tax Court in Ellery v. Commissioner5 In that case, the
taxpayer, a big-scale slot machine operator, had been convicted
for fraud under the income tax law and was about to leave town
to serve his sentence. To preserve better his illegal business, he
formed a partnership with his wife and left her in charge. The
case holds that under Ohio law a partnership may be formed for
a legal purpose only. Therefore, no partnership resulted. All of
the income was charged to the husband.
It further appears from this opinion that Ellery operated slot
machines illegally. He claimed a deduction of $500 allegedy
spent to defray the cbst of a banquet to entertain his best cus-
tomers, but he failed to prove the amount spent. It was dis-
allowed on that ground. Nevertheless, the opinion contains un-
necessary, as well as wholly inaccurate, reference to the case of
Commissioner v. Heininger,0 to be discussed presently, and says
that that case casts doubt on the holding 6f the Board of Tax
Appeals in the Silberman case. The Heininger case involved a
lawful business. Neither the Silberman nor the Ellery cases re-
lated to a lawful enterprise. There is nothing in the Heininger
case that has any bearing on a case where the items sought to be
deducted relate to expenses or losses of an illegal business. The
language in the Ellery case was not only gratuitous but grossly
erroneous.
The Tax Court in Stralla v. Commissioner7 was concerned
with expenses of a gambling ship which was anchored within the
headlands of the Santa Monica, California, harbor. The courts
had held that the ship was within the jurisdiction of the State
84. Id. at 161, 162.
85. 4 T.C. 407 (1944).
86. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
87. 9 T.C. 801 (1947).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss2/1
THE FEDERAL TAXING POWER
of California and that its operation was illegal. Certain expenses
for which deduction was claimed consisted of fines, penalties,
attorneys' fees spent in defense of criminal charges and lobby-
ing. These were denied deduction:
* * * The allowance of the deductions here claimed would
be in our opinion "to frustrate sharply defined . .. policies"
of the State of California "proscribing" gambling opera-
tions. The expenditures here in issue [i.e., fines, penalties,
attorneys' fees, etc.] were not made in the actual production
of income; deduction of expenses of that character [i.e.,
expenses related to the actual production of income] has
been allowed. The expenditures here were made to perpetu-
ate or to assure the continuance of an illegal business, and
their deduction, in our opinion, would be contrary to public
policy and not within the meaning, purpose, and intent of
the statute.28
The Stralla case is long and involved on its facts, and it is
not exactly simple to understand the language of the court as
quoted above in terms of the precise issues. It appears, however,
that the operators of the gambling ship in their tax returns
deducted from gross income expenses such as salaries, repairs,
light and power. The Commissioner had allowed the deduction.
They were not, therefore, at issue in the case. Consequently, the
court in saying that "deductions of expenses of that character has
been allowed"' 9 was simply referring to what had already hap-
pened in the case and was not attempting to say that there was
any judicial or statutory authority to justify such treatment.
This point is important in view of what happened in Comeaux v.
Commissioner,"0 to be noticed presently.
There is, of course, no basis in law, common sense, or reason,
for saying that money spent for salaries, rent, light, heat, are
not "expenditures ... made to perpetuate or to assure the con-
tinuance of an illegal business,"' 1 for without these disburse-
ments, the illegal business could not be perpetuated for a single
day. Nor is there any basis for the view that the money spent
in the payment of a fine, or for attorneys' fees in defending a
criminal charge brought against a gambling operator, is not an
expenditure "made in the actual production of income."' 92 With
88. Id. at 821.
89. Ibid.
90. 10 T.C. 201 (1948).
91. Stralla v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 801, 821 (1947).
92. Ibid.
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the operator in jail, income would dry up quickly. There is no
validity in the fine distinctions drawn by the court in this case
in support of the deductibility of salaries and like expenses. It is
significant as well that no. authority is cited in support of the
position taken by the Commissioner and the gratuitous statement
of the court in describing said position.
In Comeaux -. Commissioner93 for the first time the Tax court
used the language, "legitimate expenses of an illegitimate busi-
ness," and cited the Stralla case as authority for their being
allowable as deductible expenses. Of course, the Stralla case is
no authority for that proposition at all. It could not be by rea-
son of the simple fact that that issue was not before the court.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court in the Comeaux case said:
The second issue relates to the deduction of salaries and
miscellaneous expenses, the "legitimate expenses of an ille-
gitimate business." The amount of such items is not in dis-
pute. These expenses were incurred in earning the income
reported by petitioner or attributed to him by respondent.
In Anthony Cornero Stralla, 9 T. C. 801, at 821, this Court
recognized that such expenses are deductible, in contradis-
tinction to those expenses which are not deductible because
contrary to public policy. We said: "The expenditures here
in issue were not made in the actual production of the
income; deduction of expenses of that character has been
allowed."9 4
The Comeaux case reached the Circuit Court of Appeals, and
there it appears that the Commissioner "agreed that ... legiti-
mate expenses incurred in an illegitimate business are deducti-
ble . . . ."9 The claim is justified that the Commissioner has
been soft with the gamblers and racketeers. He has no authority
whatsoever for agreeing to allow and allowing the so-called
"legitimate expenses" of illegal businesses. All expenses related
to a gambling joint are incurred in carrying on an illegal busi-
ness and are an integral part of the same.
'In the Comeaux case, the statement was made that "[T]he
income tax law is not a tax on gross income, even if the income
be earned in an illegal business."98- Issue must be taken with
that statement. The question of whether the Internal Revenue
Code operates in a given case as a tax on gross income depends
93. 10 T.C. 201 (1948).
94. Id. at 207.
95. Comeaux v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394, 400 (10th Cir. 1949).
96. Comeaux v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 201, 207 (1948).
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upon whether the taxpayer has any legal deductions or exemp-
tions as defined in the law. If the claimed deductions cannot
be brought within the legal limits of the law, it is purely inci-
dental that the tax rate applies to gross receipts.97
It is plainly evident that no case authority exists in support
of the present practice of allowing a deduction of the expenses
of operating a business which is condemned by statute as illegal.
As to the deduction of gambling losses, a statutory develop-
ment must be noted. It has been pointed out that the case law
does not justify the deduction of gambling losses from gross
income where, by state law, gaming is illegal. It has always
been the case, however, that where the taxpayer engaged in
gaming in a state where that occupation was legal, his losses in
respect to that activity were treated exactly as were losses suf-
fered in any other legal business.98
The Treasury was not quite satisfied with this state of affairs
and in 1942 proposed to Congress an amendment to section 23
which assumes the present form of section 23 (h).99 The Trea-
sury desired by the proposed amendment to limit the deduction
of legal gambling losses to the amount of legal gambling win-
nings. The intention was to prevent a resident of Illinois, for
example, who might go to Monte Carlo or Reno and who might
(and usually did) lose sizeable sums, from deducting said losses
from his gross income produced by his regular legal occupation.
This intention is clearly shown in the statement made by Pro-
fessor Magill on behalf of the Treasury favoring the Amend-
ment.100
97. Kjar v. Commissioner, P-H 1941 B.T.A. MEm. DEC. 41,446 (1941) at
page 978:
... But while we are required to compute gross income in the same
manner whether the taxpayer's business be legal or illegal, we do not
allow the same deductions in computing taxable net income. As we
have already indicated, supra, this is because of well founded policy
reasons aimed toward giving rewards (deductions, in this case) to only
those who conduct their everyday lives and business within the confines
of the law. Accordingly, we disallow any deductions for amounts paid
for storage of liquor or for loading.
98. Beaumont v .Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 474 (1932).
99. INT. REv. GODE § 23(h): "Wagering Losses. Losses from wagering
transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such
transactions."
100. Hearings before the Committee on Finance on H.R. 7835, 73d Cong.
2d Sess. 32-33 (1934), where Dr. Magill testified as follows:
Dr. Magill. The next paragraph (g), is a new provision which is
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In spite of the unmistakable purpose of section 23(h) as
shown by the Senate Finance Committee Report, the gamblers
received a big assist from the Circuit Court of Appeals in the
case of Humphrey v. ComMissioner.010 The court there held that
section 23 (h) applied to all gambling losses, whether carried on
legally or not and whether carried on for a profit or not. There
is a strong dissenting opinion. In view of the unmistakable
congressional purpose in enacting section 23 (h), the case was
wrongly decided. Congress should by all means make a further
amendment to 23 (h) for the purpose of removing the distortion
resulting from the Humphrey opinion.
3. Expenses and losses of an illegal enterprise are not deduct-
ible where to allow their deduction would frustrate sharply
defined public policy.
This premise is the strongest of the three and is the most
compelling in denying the deductibility of any expense of an
illegal enterprise or any of its losses.
Our point of departure should be a definition of the term
"public policy." What is it? The term "public policy" has been
subject to a multitude of definitions. For our purposes here let
us resort to the "limited rule" which is as follows:
•.. The public policy of a state or a nation must be deter-
mined by its constitution, laws, and judicial decisions; not
by the varying opinions of laymen, lawyers, or judges as to
the demands of the interests of the public.102
Reference to the statutes of Illinois discloses that it is made
a crime to rent or occupy a room or enclosure for the purpose of
self-explanatory, that losses from wagering transactions are to be al-
lowed only to the extent of gains from such transactions.
T "he Chairman. Explain that paragraph.
D"r. Magill. The line which the Treasury draws is I believe,
whether or not the particular gambling transaction was legal in the
State in which it occurred; and they have gone into a good deal of
dissertation as to whether it is legal gambling.
"Senator Reed. Also, haven't they discussed the question of whether
that is the taxpayer's regular business?
Dr. Magill. You wouldn't need to in this connection, because he
could get the deduction as a loss if the transaction was entered into for
a profit, in the event that the transaction was legal.
This quotation also appears in Humphrey v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 853,
855 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1947).
101. 162 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1947).
102. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. 70 Fed. 201, 202
(8th Cir. 1895), af'd, 175 U.S. 91 (1899).
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commercial gambling'0 3 or prostitution, "0 or to possess or use
any device for the purpose of recording or registering bets or
wages. 0 5 It is illegal for any person to register or record bets
or wagers whether he does it on his own account or as agent for
another0 ° These various components of an illegal enterprise
are all "integral parts" of the illegal venture.
Practically every phase of gambling activity, if it is practiced
on a commercial basis, is condemned by the laws of the State
of Illinois and most other states. It is safe to say that the public
policy in that respect is sharply defined, even within the terms
of the limited rule.
To advance our thesis a little further, under this point, refer-
ence must be made to the Heininger0 7 case. Heininger was a
Chicago dentist who used the United States mails in the conduct
of his business. He made false teeth for people without ever
having seen them. He advertised extensively. Some of his repre-
sentations concerning his goods were found by the Postmaster
General to be fraudulent. It is important to notice at the outset
that Heininger was in a lawful business. He was egaged in a
legitimate profession, recognized by the state from whom he
held a license to practice.
Pursuant to sections 259 and 732 of Title 39 of the United
States Code, hearings were held before the solicitor of the Post
Office Department, which hearings resulted in a fraud order
being issued against Heininger deiiying him the use of the mail.
Heininger fought the fraud order all the way up to the Supreme
Court and lost. On his income tax return he claimed legal
expenses incurred in defending himself against the fraud order,
in the amount of $36,600, as deductible under section 23(a)
(1) (A). The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed
the item because allowance would frustrate the sharply defined
policies of the above mentioned Code sections, which authorized
the Postmaster General to issue fraud orders.
The Supreme Court upheld Heininger saying:
* * " The single policy of these sections is to protect the
public from fraudulent practices committed through the
use of the mails. It is not their policy to impose personal
103. ILL. REV. STAT. C. 38, § 325 (1951).
104. Id. § 162.
105. Id. §§ 341, 342, 343.
106. Id. §§ 336, 338.
107. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
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punishment on violators; such punishment is provided by
separate statute, and can be imposed only in a judicial pro-
ceeding in which the accused has the benefit of constitutional
and statutory safeguards appropriate to trial for a crime.
Nor is it their policy-to deter persons accused of violating
their terms from employing counsel to assist in presenting
a bona fide defense to a proposed fraud order. It follows
that to allow the deduction of respondent's litigation
expenses would not frustrate the policy of these statutes;
and to deny the deduction would attach a serious punitive
consequence to the Postmaster General's finding which Con-
gress has not expressly or impliedly indicated should result
from such a finding. We hold therefore that the Board of
Tax Appeals was not required to regard the administrative
finding of guilt under 39 U.S.C. §§ 259 and 732 as a rigid
criterion of the deductibility of respondent's litigation
expenses.'0
It appears from the reasoning exhibited in this opinion that
if Heininger had been charged with the crime of using the mails
to defraud and had been convicted, his legal expense would not
have been deductible because to have permitted deductibility
would have frustrated the sharply defined public policy of the
mail fraud sections of the law.
Applying this reasoning to the illegal businesses of gambling,
prostitution, extortion and racketeering in general, we can say
that any expense arising out of an activity which is prohibited
and punished by law must be denied deductibility, because it
frustrates the public policy which is sharply defined by the
statute.
The case of Lilly v. Commissioner"01 is significant. The issue
was whether the "kickbacks" by optical houses could be deducted
by them (the optical houses) as ordinary expenses under section
23(a) (1) (A). There was no statute, either state or federal,
condemning the rebate practice. As a result of that state of fact,
the Supreme Court said:
... The policies frustrated must be national or state poli-
cies evidenced by some governmental declaration of them.
In 1943 and 1944 there were no such declared public policies
proscribing the payments which were made by petitioners
to the doctors. 110
108. Id. at 474.
109. 343 U.S. 90 (1952), reversing 14 T.C. 1066 (1950), 188 F.2d 269
(4th Cir. 1951).
110. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952).
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Of course, in the case of commercial gambling we do have a
declared public policy in statute form, condemning the enter-
prise and making it entirely illegal. 1
The Lilly case also points out the fact that the issue to be
resolved in this respect is quite different where the enterprise
is an illegal one:
We do not have before us the issue that would be pre-
sented by expenditures which themselves violated a federal
or state law or were incidental to such violations. In such
a case it could be argued that the outlawed expenditures,
by virtue of their illegality, were not "ordinary and neces-
sary" business expenses within the meaning of § 23(a) (1)
(A).112
The operation of a gambling house is illegal by state law."3
Any expenditure made in its operation would certainly be "in-
cidental to such violation."
The conclusion is reached that Congress has not only the
power, but the duty as well, if it is preoccupied at all with the
general welfare of the people, to classify illegal gains separately
from honest income and to tax the former at a much higher
rate. Section 23(h) should be amended and made to express
clearly and unmistakably the purpose for which it was enacted.
The Bureau should restore the former rulings which denied
deduction of expenses and losses of illegal business.
111. See notes 103, 105, 106 supra. For other state statutes to the same
effect, see, for example, Mo. REv. STAT. §563.370 (1949) and N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 971 et seq.
112. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 94 (1952).
113. See note 103 supra.
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